东京审判的一个小的国际法花絮

simoncat

以前看过相关书籍，知道法官团的印度法官主张对战犯无罪释放。今天中午又在吃饭的时候看了新片《东京审判》，很是好奇，于是简单搜索了一下印度法官帕尔的有关资料，得到如下个人觉得比较有意思的东西，与大家共享。


帕尔的意见书 ，转自joanna的博客
发表时间: 2006-8-29  浏览次数: 121
东京审判法官中唯一的国际法专家印度法官帕尔认为，此次审判缺乏国际法依据，主张被告全部无罪。但GHQ通过表决不公布帕尔的意见书。帕尔的意见书厚达1235页，意见书的主要理论依据便是所谓的“侵略战争是一种国家行为，国际法的追诉对象仅仅是国家，而不能罪及个人”（比帕尔早的歌德也说过：德行是自己的，罪恶是时代的）；“即使日本在那场战争负有道德的责任，但是没有承担法律的责任”。摘录部分内容如下：

No distinction between just and unjust war

In the 8th edition of Hall''s International Law (1924), we find the following passages:
\"As international law is destitute of any judicial or administrative machinery, it leaves states, which think themselves aggrieved, and which have exhausted all peaceable methods of obtaining satisfaction, to exact redress for themselves by force. It thus recognizes war as a permitted mode of giving effect to its decisions. Theoretically,乧.. as it (international law) professes to cover the whole field of the relations of states which can be brought within the scope of law, it ought to determine the causes for which war can be justly undertaken; 乧.. it might also not unreasonably go on to discourage the commission of wrongs by subjecting a wrongdoer to special disabilities.
The first of these ends it attains to a certain degree, though very imperfectly乧. In most of the disputes which arise between states, the grounds of quarrel, though they might probably be always brought into connection with the wide fundamental principles of law, are too complex to be judged with any certainty by reference to them; sometimes again they have their origin in divergent notions, honestly entertained, as to what those principles consist in, and consequently as to the injunctions of secondary principles by which action is immediately governed; and sometimes they are caused by collisions of naked interest or sentiment, in which there is no question of right, but which are so violent as to render settlement impossible until a struggle has taken place. It is not, therefore, possible to frame general rules which will be of any practical value.
The second end international law does not even endeavor to attain. However able law might be to declare one of two combatants to have committed a wrong, it would be idle for it to affect to impart the character of a penalty to war when it is powerless to enforce its decisions.乧 International law has consequently no alternative but to accept war, independently of the justice of its origin, as a relation which the parties to it may set up if they choose, and to busy itself only in regulating the effects of the relation. Hence both parties to every war are regarded as being in an identical legal position, and consequently as being possessed of equal rights.\"

I need not stop here to express my view of the character of an international community or of international law. Both the expressions are used in specific senses in relation to international life as I would endeavor to show later. But even taking them in unqualified sense, no distinction was made between just and unjust war or between non-aggressive and aggressive war, and no difference in the legal character of a war was based on any such distinction.


No judge for the solution of international struggle
I have elsewhere given my view of the character of the so-called international community as it stood on the eve of the Second World War. It was simply a coordinated body of several independent sovereign units and certainly was not a body of which the order or security could be said to have been provided by law.
By saying this, I do not mean to suggest any absolute negation of international law. It is not my suggestion that the observance of the rules of international law, so far as these go, is not a matter of the obligation. These rules might have resulted from the calculation that their observance was not incompatible with the interest of the state. Yet, their observance need not be characterized as the result of such calculation. A state before being a willing party to a rule, might have willed thus on the basis of some such calculation, but after contribution of its \"will\", which is essential for the creation of the rule, it may not retain any right to withdraw from the obligation of the rule thus created. The rule thus exists independently of the will of the parties. It is of no consequence that in coming into existence it had to depend on such will. Yet, simply because the several states are thus subjected to certain obligatory rules, it does not follow that the states have formed a community under a reign of law. Its order or security is not yet provided by law. Peace in such a community is only a negative concept---it is simply a negation of war, or an assurance of the status quo. Even now each state is left to perform for itself the distributive function. The basis of international relations is still the competitive struggle of states, a struggle for the solution of which there is still no judge, no executor, no standard of decision. There are still dominated and enslaved nations, and there is no provision anywhere in the system for any peaceful readjustment without struggle. It is left to the nations themselves to see the readjustment.


Conclusion
The most ingenious of the reasons that were given for fixing the criminal responsibility on the accused is that thereby the character of the whole defeated nation will be amply vindicated, and this will help the promotion of better understanding and good felling between the individual citizens of the defeated and of the victor states. The entire defeated nation, it is said, has, by the war, provoked the hatred of the peace-loving nations. By the trial and punishment of these few persons who were really responsible for the war, the world will know that the defeated nation like all other nations was equally sinned against by these warlords. This will be a real and substantial contribution to the future peace of the world by repelling from the minds of the peace-loving nations all hatred towards the defeated nation and replacing such hatred with sympathy and good feeling. Assuming it to be so, I do not see how this coveted object would justify the punishment of these individuals by a court of law. If such is the object of a trial like the present, the same result could easily have been achieved by a commission of inquiry for war responsibility. Such a commission might have been manned by competent judges from different nationalities and their declaration would have produced the desired effect without any unnecessary straining of the law.

After giving my anxious and careful consideration to the reasons given by the prosecution as also to the options of the various authorities I have arrived at the conclusion:
1. That no category of war became criminal or illegal in international life.
2. That the individuals comprising the government and functioning as agents of that government incur no criminal responsibility in international law for the acts alleged.
3. That the international community has not as yet reached a stage which would make it expedient to include judicial process for condemning and punishing either states or individuals.

I have not said anything about the alleged object of the Japanese plane or conspiracy. I believe no one will seriously contend that domination of one nation by another became a crime in international life. Apart from the question of legality or otherwise of the means designed to achieve this object it must be held that the object itself was not yet illegal or criminal in international life. In any other view, the entire international community would be a community of criminal races. At least many of the powerful nations are living this sort of life and if these acts are criminal then the entire international community is living that criminal life, some actually committing the crime and others becoming accessories after the fact in these crimes. No nation has as yet treated such acts as crimes and all the powerful nations continue close relations with the nations that had committed such acts.

Questions of law are not decided in an intellectual quarantine area in which legal doctrine and the local history of the dispute alone are retained and all else is forcibly excluded. We cannot afford to be ignorant of the world in which dispute arise.

simoncat

所谓“帕尔博士的日本无罪论” （节选自《日本右翼言论批判》，昆仑出版社出版，作者王向远）

   到了1952年4月，也就是东京审判刚刚过去两年之后，由于国际形势的变化和美国对日策略的调整，田中认为时机成熟，遂将撰写的《真理的裁判·帕尔的日本无罪论》一书交太平洋出版社公开刊行。当年5月1田中正明

   《帕尔法官的日本无罪论》书影

   0日的《朝日新闻》用一整版作了广告，发行后第十三天就三次印刷，到6月印刷了六次，成为少见的畅销书。这可以说是日本战后、也是东京审判后第一本系统地试图全面否定东京审判的判决、为日本侵略战争全面免罪的书。因而在战后日本右翼言论史上，具有显著的标志性和代表性。到了1963年，田中正明在对该书进一步修订，又推出了《帕尔博士的日本无罪论》（慧文社初版），时至今日，多次再版。这本书将田中正明自己对侵略战争、特别是对南京大屠杀及松井石根的无罪辩解，与帕尔的判词搅混在一起，并常常将后者拿来印证前者，实际上应该称它为“帕尔与田中正明的日本无罪论”才较为恰当。

   那么，被田中像救命稻草一样抓住不放的这个帕尔，是个什么人呢？笔者手头的有关材料不足，不过田中正明在《帕尔博士的日本无罪论》中，对帕尔的生平有所介绍，而且帕尔后来曾四次访问日本，田中与帕尔也密切交往，帕尔甚至对田中说“你是我永远的孩子”。由此田中对帕尔的生平当有所了解，他在书后也附了一个《帕尔小传》，我们可从田中的介绍中大体看出一些眉目。

   拉德·比诺德·帕尔（1886～1967），法学博士，出生于印度宾格尔邦，毕业于加尔各答大学。1941年曾任加尔各答高等法院法官，1944年任加尔各答大学校长，1946年被当时的印度首相奈尔指派为东京审判法官。关于帕尔年轻时代的思想，田中正明写道：“1905年，他十九岁的时候，亚洲小国日本打败俄罗斯帝国的报道传到印度，他很受触动，曾回忆说：‘作为有色人种的日本，与北方的强大的白人帝国主义战斗并取得了胜利，这个消息使我们的心大为振奋。我们走过白人面前时故意昂首挺胸。我还记得自己和老师及同事们一起，每天打旗提灯参加游行的情景。我在对日本憧憬的同时获得了对祖国的自信，内心十分兴奋。我开始思考印度的独立了。”由此可见，当时的帕尔作为受西方白人统治下的印度人，有着强烈的人种观念，只知道“有色人种”日本把白人俄罗斯打败了，但却没有搞清楚那场战争是什么性质，不明白那是两个列强在中国领土上为争夺中国东北所进行的侵略战争。从此以后他对日本有了特别的“好感”。

   当帕尔被指派为远东国际法庭法官来到日本以后，“他就很快意识到他自己不值得与另外十位法官交谈，而是拒绝一切交往，一人呆在帝国饭店自己的房间里……专心调查与写作”。田中正明《パ—ル判事の日本無罪論》，第9页，小学馆文库2001年版。这也说明帕尔从一开始就认定日本战犯无罪，而与认为日本战犯有罪的另外十位法官话不投机，并拒绝交流。据说在审判接近开始的时候，帕尔接到女儿的电报，因夫人有病赶回印度探望。病床上的夫人对他说：“你现在担负着事关日本命运的审判重任，在你完成使命之前，我决不死，请你放心，快回日本去吧。”田中正明《パ—ル判事の日本無罪論》，第10页，小学馆文库2001年版。可见，在帕尔及其夫人眼里，是把对日本战犯的审判与所谓“日本的命运”（实际上不是日本的命运，而是战犯的命运）混在一起的。根据这样一些关于帕尔的生平的信息，基本可以归纳为两点。第一，作为一个来自长期遭受白人殖民统治国家的帕尔，一开始就对英美主导的东京审判怀有抗拒心理，是可以理解的，但帕尔却进一步从有色人种与白人的战争这样一种理念——这正是日本军国主义的“大东亚战争”的理念——出发，将日本发动的战争（当然包括侵华战争）作为亚洲有色人种对白人的战争，而予以特别的同情，导致了他对日本侵华战争的本质没有清醒的正确的认识。第二，帕尔对日本的侵华暴行本来就不了解，在先入为主的观念指导下，帕尔对日本侵华的野蛮暴行更是有意无意的予以忽略、淡化，对控方提出的大量资料证据表示了冷漠的怀疑态度，基本上不予采信。例如，在关于松井石根的审判中，帕尔认为，松井石根对南京军纪问题不应负责任，“虽然松井石根大将采取的措施（指整顿军纪——引者注）没有奏效，但也不能表明那些措施是不诚实的。在本案中，不能认为松井被告故意而且非法地无视法律的责任。”田中正明《パ—ル判事の日本無罪論》，第174页，小学馆文库2001年版。他还对法庭上出庭作证的南京大屠杀的证人证词表示了极度的不信任，称那些目击者是“因有偏见和臆测、很容易发生不着边际的妄想”，并对有关证词百般挑剔。田中正明《パ—ル判事の日本無罪論》，第171页，小学馆文库2001年版。帕尔法官的判词还在总体上为日本的侵略战争辩护，辩护十分牵强。例如，认为日本的那些战犯被告们没有“共同密谋”，不构成“共同密谋罪”。理由是那些战犯此前根本没有实际交流，如何“密谋”？他显然把一个复杂的国家机器看成了一个结构简单的小团体，认定只有谋面才能密谋；他又认为根据“事后法”来审判日本战犯违反了法律的“不回溯”原则。但是东京审判绝不是一般的刑事审判，它所面对的是前所未有的国际屠杀犯罪，“事前法”又在哪里？至于说到东京审判是“胜者对败者的审判”，实际上世界上任何一种审判都是“胜者对败者的审判”，换言之，审判者要有足够的权力（往往是国家权力）作为支撑。但东京审判既是胜者对败者的审判，同时又是正义的胜者对非正义的败者的审判。

   显然，帕尔对日本军国主义的这些袒护和辩护都是不值一驳的，他对南京大屠杀事实不予采信的傲慢与顽固的态度，是对中国人民、特别是死于屠杀的中国三十万冤魂的亵渎，更是“国际法官”的耻辱。在这大是大非面前，帕尔表明了自己决不是田中正明所吹嘘的什么“国际法著名学者”（从他的生平来看，他实际上只是一个官僚，并非真正的学者）。仅以帕尔在东京审判中的表现来看，作为一个“国际法学者”，他对当时的国际关系缺乏正确了解；作为一名“法官”，他缺少起码的良知与公正之心，总之他是一个地地道道的糊涂法官无疑。然而，帕尔的这些谬论，却在此后被日本右翼学者——除了田中正明外，还有小室直树、渡部升一等许多人——反复征引，成为否定日本侵略罪责的理论根据。在对侵略战争整体上没有深刻反省、对战争责任者的惩处不了了之的情况下，帕尔的“无罪”判决，令日本许多人感激涕零，更有人称其为“日本的恩人”。战后，帕尔不顾年高体弱，曾四次来日本访问，并受到了日本朝野的隆重礼遇。1996年，帕尔的儿子来日时称：“父亲生前希望埋葬在京都。”（可见帕尔的“亲日”情怀非同一般）。在日本政界、财界的支持下，1997年12月，在供奉着许多“大东亚战争英灵”的京都灵山护国神社“昭和社”正面的山丘上，修建了一座气派的“帕尔博士显彰碑”。显彰碑的正前方的石碑上，镶着帕尔的画像。为对本国做出贡献的外国人士修筑“显彰碑”之类表达纪念之情，本无可厚非。但是，为这么一个无视历史事实、丧失了国际法官起码的公正与良知、宣布日本战犯“全员无罪”、妨碍日本社会战争反省的人树碑立传，从一个侧面表明了日本在侵略战争反省问题上的不良现状。不过，将帕尔的“显彰碑”与日本“大东亚战争英灵”碑放在一起，则似乎十分相称，其历史角色定位亦可一目了然。